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Case No. 7255 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAGOOX CO:JIP ANY, a corporation, 
SALT AIR BEACH COMPANY, a 
corporation, CO\~EY GAS & OIL 
CO~IP ANY, a partnership, INTER-
:JIOU:XTAIN THEATRES, INC., a 
corporation, and UPTOWN THEA-
TRE CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondent,s, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION, 
a public corporation, and AARON W. 
TRACY, RULON S. HOWELLS, AR-
THUR L. CRAWFORD, comprising 
the Utah State Board of the Depart-
ment of Publicity and Industrial De-
velopment, and BEEHIVE MID-
WAYS, INC., a corporation, 
Defenaants and Appellants. 
Case No. 7255 
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Respondents are in accord with the statements of 
fact as set forth in the appellants' brief. In fact, there 
was no dispute at the trial of the action as to any is-
sues of fact, but only as to the materiality as to some 
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2 
presented by the appellants. It was the position of the 
respondents at the trial that the only question was one 
of law-did the Utah State Fair A.ss,ociation have the 
authority to enter int~o the lease agreements (Exhibits 
B arnd C) with Beehive Midways, Inc? Respondents 
are of the opinion that this is the only question to be 
determined by this Honorable Court, and anything which 
was done by any parties subsequent to the execution 
of the agreement is immaterial. If the agreements were 
beyond the authority of the Utah State Fair Associa-
tion, then they were void and no acts of the parties could 
validate them. 
Appellants have set forth eight Assignments of 
Error in their brief, but have not argued them separ-
ately. Instead they have divided their argument into 
six topics. In the interest of convenience and clarity, 
respondents will endeavor to discuss and answer each 
of these topics in the order in which they appear in the 
brief of appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EX'TENT OF POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES 
AND STATE AGENCIES. 
At the outset, respondents wish to state that they 
are in accord with the rule of law set forth by the ap-
pellants, namely, that a municipality or state agency is 
limited to those powers expressly granted, to those ne-
cessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers ex-
pressly granted, and to those essential to the declared 
~· I 
•,' 
\ 
I ,.,, •'' 
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objects and purposes of the .~orporation, and that this 
rule is relaxed when a municipality .. or governmental 
agency is not acting in a governmental capacity; how-
ever, respondents feel that this foregoing rule of law 
finds no application in the instant case for the reasons 
stated hereinafter. 
Appellants place great .stress upon Utah Code An-
notated 1943, 85-4-1, and quote portions of this statute 
upon page twenty-six of their brief. For the court's con-
venience, we would like to set forth the entire statute, 
underlining the portions deleted in appellants' brief, 
which we consider to be of importance : 
"The Utah state fair association is con-
tinued a body corporate with perpetual succes-
sion subject to the direction, supervision and con-· 
trol of the commissioners of the department of 
publicity and industrial development. It may 
have and use a corporate seal, and by the afore-
said name may sue and be sued, contract and be 
contracted with, and take amd hold by purchase, 
gift, devise or bequest, real and ·personal property 
required fo.r ~ts uses. It may also, with the ap-
proval of the department of finance, conv.ert such 
property, when not suitable for its uses, into other 
property which may be suitable for its uses, into 
other property, or into money provided, however, 
that money r·eceived from such conversion shall 
be paid into the state treasury and placed to the 
credit of the state fair association maintenance 
fund. The Utah state fair association shall be 
deemed a public corporation, and its property 
shall be ·exempt from all taxes and assessments.'' 
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The foregoing statute in granting to the fair asso-
ciation the power to ''convert such property,'' has ref- I ; 
erence to that property which it might ''take and hold I 
by purchase, gift, devise or bequest, real and personal 
property required for its uses.'' It does not grant to 
the fair association the power to convert property ac. 
quired under the original grant to the association. Pro-
perty here involved is a portion of the original grant 
by the State of Utah to the Utah State Fair Association. 
Commencing upon page twenty-seven of Appellants' 
brief, it is argued that the agreement with Beehive Mid-
ways, Inc. does nothing more than convert a portion 
of the fair grounds to another and more beneficial use, 
and that the agreement is in effect a mere exchange of 
different parcels of land. This argument absolutely ig-
nores the terms of the agreement itself. We quote the 
first sentence of paragraph one of the agreement (Ex-
hibit B): 
'' 1. That the Company (Beehive Midways, 
Inc.) shall have the exclusive right to O·perate and 
licensp others to operate all .a'YYIJUSement rides, 
g~ames ~arnd shows upon the Utah state fair 
grounds during the years 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950 
and 1951." (Italics ours) 
From the very terms of the agreement itself, Bee-
hive Midways, Inc. is granted the exclusive right to 
operate all amusement rides, games and shows upon any 
and all portions of the state fair grounds. Thus, it is 
seen that the agreement is not a lease for a particular 
portion of the state fair grounds, but is in the nature 
I 
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5 
of a franchise or license whereunder Beehive l\fidways, 
Inc. is given a monopoly to operate all forms of amuse-
ments and shows that are conducted upon the fair 
grounds. 
The lease agreement will further disclose the fact 
that the Fair Board has actually gone into the amuse-
ment business. The lease provides for the Fair Board 
to receive a percentage of the admission price of all ad-
missions, and one-half of all money paid upon conces-
sion space. It further provides that all contracts that 
may be entered into by the company (Beehive Midways, 
Inc.) and licensee-concessionaires shall provide that ad-
mission fees or charges collected by the concessionaires 
shall be subject to the approval of the Fair Board and 
the Company (Beehive Midways, Inc.). The lease agree-
ment further gives the Fair Board the right at its· dis-
cretion to employ all cashiers for the sale of admission 
to rides and shows or any percentage concession oper-
ated either by the Company (Beehive Midways, Inc.) 
or its licensees. The lease agreement further provides 
that the Fair Board shall maintain all rest rooms within 
the midway (that is, where the bulk of the shows were 
being held), and shall provide at its own expense (Bee-
hive Midways, Inc.) public liability insurance for the 
protection of not only the Company (Beehive Midways, 
Inc.), but the Fair Board against liability arising out 
of the operation of the midway. It further provides that 
the Company (Beehive Midways, Inc.) shall be subject 
to all the rules and regulations published by the Fair 
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Board for the operation of the Utah State Fair Asso-
cia:tion. 
In determining the extent of the fair association's 
power in leasing the property entrusted to it, reference 
must be made to 85-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
which, in the opinion of respondents, is controlling in 
the instant case. This statute reads as follows: 
1., 
''The purpose of the association shall be to I '·J: 
promote in the state of Utah stock breeding, agri- . 
culture, horticulture, mining, manufacturing, and 
the domestic scienoes and arts; and the associa-
- tion shall have the authority to use and to lease 
the property of the association, during any por-
tion of the interval between the holding of the 
annual or biennial exhibitions, for private stock 
exhibitions, shows, racing meets, and for other 
legitimate purposes, upon terms and conditions 
to be prescribed by the board of directors. All 
moneys received from such leases shall be covered 
into the state treasury at the end of each month 
and placed to the credit of the state fair main-
tenance fund.'' 
Under the terms of this statute the fair association 
is granted authority to lease property "during any por-
tion of the interval between the holding of the annual 
or biennial exhibition for private stock exhibitions, 
shows, racing meets and for other legitimate purposes.'' 
Thus it will be seen that the fair association's power 
to lease is expressly limited by statute in two particu-
lars-(!) length and period of lease and (2) purposes 
of the lease. 
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The lease arrangement in question is in flagrant 
violation of the first limitation. It is for a five year 
period with an option for an additional five years. It 
is for the full term of each year and is not confined to 
"any portion of the interval between the holding of the 
annual or biennial exhibition.'' Statutory authority of 
public officers must ~e strictly construed. 46 C. J., 
Page 1032. This rule is particularly applicable where 
public officers are granted the authority to alienate 
state lands or property. 
50 C. J., Page 1139; 
Taylor v. Balderston (Ida.) 68 P. 2d. 761, 763; 
Carpenter v. Okanogan County (Wash.) 299 P. 400. 
In Panama-Pacific Inte.mational Exposition Com-
pany v. Panama Pacific International Expoilition Com-
missi.on (Cal.) 174 P. 890, the court held that where a 
public commission is granted power over state property, 
and the language of the grant contains terms which 
qualify the power, the qualifications are to be construed 
as conditions beyond which the grantee of the power 
eannot go, insofar as such qualifications are favorable to 
the state. 
That the authority of public officers is limited to 
the terms of the statute conferring such authority is 
recognized by this court in Oampbell Building Oompany 
v. State Road Cornmission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d. 857. 
Our legislature has seen fit to limit the leasing 
power of the fair association to certain intervals, and 
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8 
the lease agreements under consideration here violate 
such limitation. The wi.sdom of such limitation is not 
for us to decide, but rather for the legislature. 
The lease agreements with Beehive Midways, Inc. 
also violate the second limitation of 85-4-7, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, namely the purposes for which the state 
property may be leased. Under the statute they may 
lease the property for private stock exhibitions, shows 
and racing meets. The specific purposes as set forth 
are then followed by the words ''and for other legiti-
mate purposes.'' The lease agreements under con-
sideration certainly do not fall within any of the speci-
fic purposes set forth in the statute, and must be justi-
fied, if they can, as falling within the phrase ''and for 
other legitimate purposes." It is the position of the 
respondents that this last quoted phrase does not en-
large the authority to such an extent as to permit the 
leasing of the association's property for the purposes 
of amusement rides, games and shows. The doctrine of 
ejusdem generis is based on the theory that if the legis-
lature had intended general words to he used in an 
unrestricted sense, it should have made no mention of 
particular classes as was done in the instant case. 
Bush Terminal Company, 93 Fed. 2d., 659, 660. 
Where words of specific and limited significance in 
a statute are followed by general words. of a more com-
prehensive import, the general words should be con-
strued as embracing only such persons, places or things 
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as are of like kind or class to those de signa ted by the 
specific words. 
Wiggins v. State, 172 Ind. 78, 84 N.E. 718; 
Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 40, 26 N.E. 839. 
In Hurtt·. Oak Downs, Inc. (Tex.) 85 S.W. 2d., 294, 
298, the court stated that under the rule of ejusdem 
generis, the particular words are presumed to describe 
certain species, and the general words to be used for the 
purpose of including other species of the same genus, 
for the reason that, if the legislature had intended the 
general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, it 
would have made no mention of particular classes. The 
words 'other' or 'any other' following an enumeration 
of particular classes, are therefore, to be read as 'other 
such like' and to include only others of a like kind and 
character. 
It is hard, if not impossible, to conceive that amuse-
ment rides, games and shows can be 'other such like' 
as private stock exhibitions, shows and racing meets. 
Respondents cannot place too much emphasis upon 
the provisions of 85-4-7, wherein is set forth the pur-
poses of the Utah State Fair .Association. This statute 
is unequivocal and definite as to what these purposes 
are. It states that the purpose of the association shall 
be, ''to promote in the State of Utah stock breeding, 
agriculture, horticulture, mining, manufacturing and the 
domestic sciences and arts." From these words it is 
evident that the Utah State Fair .Association is a branch 
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10 
of the state government, created to educate the people 
regarding agriculture, stock breeding, horticulture, min-
ing, manufacturing and the domestic sciences and arts. 
It was not created to provide amusement for the people 
of the State of Utah. In entering into the agreement 
with Beehive Midways, Inc., the state fair association 
is departing from its main objective, as set forth in the 
statute, and is making its education purposes secondary 
to the amusement business. Contrary to appellants' 
statement on page thirty of their brief, the Utah State 
Fair Association was created to promote the general 
welfare of the people of the State of Utah. 
It was stated in Zoeller v. State Board of Agricul-
ture (Ky.) 173 S.W. 1143, 1144 as follows: 
'' . . . The purpose of the holding of a state 
fair is to enlighten and educate all the people 
of the state in regard to the more advanced meth-
ods of agriculture, forestry, growing of livestock, 
and poultry, and to educate the people as to the 
most profitable kind of liv.estock to be raised, and 
the most suitable crops in which to till the soil, 
and the most advanced methods of doing same. 
It cannot be successfully contended that the en-
lightenment and education received by the people 
at the exhibitions given by the state board of agri-
culture are any less valuable or the information 
received ther.e any less worthy of being dissemin-
ated by the state government than the education 
given in the public schools of the state.'' 
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In re: Rhea v. Newman (Ky.) 156 S.W. 154, 160, 
the court made the following statement: 
"The state fair is one of the great institu-
tions of the state. It was created for the pur-
pose of improving and educating the people of 
the state along highly important lines and no one 
will, or can, successfully contend that the state 
fair is not one of the most important and essen-
tial adjuncts of the state government. In these 
times of greatly increased population and the con-
sequent increased demands for the products of the 
soil, no other line of business activity conduces 
as much to the public prosperity or improved 
farming methods. In order to keep abreast of 
the times our farmers must use the most im-
proved methods, and the easiest way to induce 
them to do this is by causing them to se,e and thus 
become i~terested in what others are doing.'' 
The two foregoing cases clearly set forth the objects 
and purposes of a state fair association. The same is 
true of the Utah State Fair Association and is so recog-
nized in the language of the statute itself. The Utah 
State Fair Association was created for educational pur-
poses, and as such, acts in a governmental capacity as an 
arm of the state government. Both of the Kentucky cases 
heretofore quoted from held that the state fair was a 
government function. 
'The fact that the Utah State Fair Board was created 
for the purpose of improving a.nd educating the people of 
this state in regard to more advanced methods of agri-
culture, growing of livestock, etc., is fundamental. The 
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further fact that the Utah State Fair Board, by its past 
operations, has strayed from this highly important pur-
pose has been a subject of public concern. We hope we 
may have the indulgence of the court in referring to an 
article which appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune on 
January 20, 1949, on page 26, which is as follows: 
"FAIRS WANDER FROM GOALS, BUREAU 
SAYS 
''Charging that recent state fairs have strayed 
from educational to entertainment affairs, fair 
committe.e members of the Utah State Farm 
Bureau federation Wednesday were preparing a 
request that the fair be returned to its original 
purpose. 
''A committee headed by A. V. Smoot, Corinne, 
Box Elder county, was named at an earlier meet-
ing to prepare recommendations for preparation 
to Gov. J. Bracken Lee on ways and means of 
placing the state fair on an educational basis and 
assuring agriculture its rightful position at the 
fair. 
"Others named to the committee were Lee 
Thurgood, Clearfield, representing dairy breed-
ers; Merrill Warnick, Pleasant Grove, Utah, 
Dairy federation; J. A. Howell, Ogden, state 
horticultural society, and Alvin Barton, Manti, 
Sanpete county, livestock interests.'' 
Respondents concede that the Utah State Fair As-
sociation may, while holding a biennial exhibition or 
annual exhibition, provide amusement rides, shows and 
games for the purpose of attracting people to the state 
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13 
fair. However, the providing of these amus,ements, 
shows and games is only incidental to the main objec-
tive, which is education. The Utah State Fair Associa-
tion was not created to promote amusement or provide 
profit to the State of Utah, which is certainly the result 
of the agreement with Beehive Midways, Inc. It is 
stated in 1 Cal. Jur., page 86, as follows: 
'' . . . anything done by the state as to the 
general conduct of the state fair must necessarily 
relate to the general public welfare and cannot 
be construed, in any just sense, as an act for the 
promotion of business for a profit.'' 
Can it be said that providing the people of the State 
of Utah with amusement shows and games for a profit 
in any way relates to the general public welfare~ The · 
legislature specifically recognizes the propositjon that 
the educational purposes of the state fair association 
shall not be subserviant to any other purpose. 
In Sec. 85-4-7, the legislature has enumerated the 
purposes of the association and then specifically limited 
the authority of the association to lease its property. It 
limited the leasing of the property to periods during any 
portion of the interval between the holding of the annual 
and biennial exhibitions. If the legislature had desired 
long term leases of the association property, it would 
have not set forth this limitation. 
Thus it will be seen that the authority of the Utah 
State Fair Association to lease its property is limited to 
private stock exhibitions, shows, racing meets and things 
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of a similar genus, and then only for a term during any 
portion ofthe interval between the holding of the annual 
or biennial exhibitions. The agreements with Beehive 
Midways, Inc. do not fall within the same genus as pri-
vate stock exhibitions, shows and racing meets and cer-
tainly exceed the limitations in the statute relating to 
the term of any lease. 
II. THE STATE FAIR BOARD HAD AUTHORITY 
TO ENTER INTO THE LEASE AGREEMENT. 
Much of the argument contained under this topic has 
been answered by respondents under the previous topic. 
In this argument the appellants in their brief again rely 
upon the proposition that the state fair association has 
the power to sell, buy or exchange property and, there-
fore, must have the authority to lease its property. We 
again invite the court's. attention to the agreements them-
selves, which are not in any sense a lease of the prop-
erty, but are rather an exclusive franchise or license 
granted to Beehive Midways, Inc. We would like also 
to point out again that the state fair association's author-
ity to sell, buy or exchange property relates only to that 
property acquired since the original grant. 
While it might be conceded that often times the 
power to sell includes the power to lease, we do not 
think this rule applicable in the instant case inasmuch 
as the statutes of the State of Utah (85-4-7) expressly 
limit the power of the state fair association in leasing 
its property. 
~, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Furthermore, while it may be true that under cer-
tain circumstanc-es a city or similar entity may determine 
that its property devoted to a public use is not needed for 
such use either for a limited time or as part of its acreage 
and, therefore, can make leases accordingly, this rule is 
not applicable to the instant case, inasmuch as there is 
no showing that the property of the state fair associa-
tion is not needed for a public use. Also, as has been 
stressed before, the agreements under consideration do 
not amount to the leasing of a certain portion of the 
state fair lands, but rather grant to Beehive Midways, 
Inc. the exclusive right to operate at any time of the year, 
amusement rides, games and shows on any and all parts 
of the state fair lands. 
Respondents are of the opinion that the agreement 
under consideration violates the spirit of Article VI, Sec-
tion 26, Subdivision 16, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, which prohibits the legislature from granting to 
an individual, association or corporation any privilege, 
immunity or franchise. The agreements under considera-
tion grant to Beehive Midways, Inc. ''the exclusive right 
to operate and license others to opera;te all amusement 
rides, games and shows upon the Utah state fair 
grounds'' for a period of five years. This is certainly in 
the nature of a special franchise or privilege which the 
legislature of the State of Utah would be prohibited from 
granting. If the Utah State Legislature could not grant 
such a right, it is hard to understand how the Utah State 
Fair Association, which is an arm of the government, 
could do so. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
III. STATE OFFICERS MAY ENTER INTO CON-
TRACTS SUCH AS THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
HERE INVOLVED EXTENDING BEYOND 
'THEIR TERM OF OFFICE. 
IV. THE PRES~NT STATE FAIR BOARD MAY 
BIND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN A LEASE CON-
TRACT SUCH AS THAT HERE INVOLVED. 
For convenience, respondents will argue the above 
two topics together inasmuch as they relate to the same 
subject matter. 
'The general rule of law relating to contracts ex-
tending beyond the term of public officers is stated in 
43 Am. Jur., Page 101, as follows: 
''The power of public officers to enter into 
contracts which extend beyond the terms of their 
offices depends primarily upon the extent of their 
authority under the law. A distinction has been 
drawn between two classes of powers,- gov-
ernmental or legislative and proprietary or busi-
ness. In the exercise of the governmental or legis-
lative powers, a board, in the absence of statu-
tory provision, cannot make a contract extending 
beyond its own term. But in the exercise of busi-
ness or proprietary powers, a board may contract 
as any individual, unless restrained by statutory 
provision to the contrary. Obviously, contracts 
extending beyond the terms of the officers exe-
cuting them will be held invalid where the making 
of the contracts tends to limit or diminish the ef-
ficiency of those who will succeed the incumbents 
in office or usurps power which was clearly in-
tended to be given to the successors." 
I 
\ 
) 
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The lease and supplemental agreement under con-
sideration extends beyond the term of office of the mem-
bers of the Utah State Fair Board (See Exhibit E), 
and certainly would limit and diminish the effeciency 
of their successors in the performance of their duties. If 
the lease and supplemental agreement should be ~eld to 
be valid, then the succe·ssors of the present members of 
the Utah State Fair Board would be bound by their 
terms and conditions regardless of the necessity of any 
change of policy, plans or conditions. 
As to whether the State Fair Board acts in a gov-
ernmental or proprietary capacity in leasing the associa-
tion's property, reference can be made to those cases 
wherein state fair boards have been sued in tort. In tort 
actions the general rule is that a governmental agency 
cannot be held liable if it is acting in a governmental 
capacity. It has been generally held that state fair 
boards in conducting state fairs exercise a governmental 
function. See 52 A. L. R. 1405, 1407. In the case of Zoelle.r 
v. State Board of Agriculture (Supra), it was held that 
the Kentucky State Board of Agriculture was an agency 
of the state and could not be held liable in tort inasmuch 
as it was acting in a governmental rather than in a 
private capacity. The Kentucky State Board of Agricul-
ture was a state corporation having the right to sue and 
be sued. It was not a corporation for a pecuniary profit 
and was empowered to conduct state fairs. All profits, 
if any, derived from the conduct of the state fairs were to 
be paid into the State Treasury. The Kentucky State 
Board of Agriculture was, in relation to state fairs, in 
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a similar position to the Utah State Fair Association. The 
Utah State Fair Association is a governmental agency 
not formed for a pecuniary profit; it has the right to sue 
and be sued and is empowered to conduct stat-e fairs. 
Thus, using the case of Zoeller v. Bo1ard of Agricul-
tur'e as an analogy, the Utah State Fair Association 
could not be held liable in tort in the exercise of any of 
its functions inasmuch as such functions are govern-
mental and it could not enter into a contract beyond the 
terms of the officers for the same reason. 
Moore v. Lucern County, 262 Pa. 216, 105 
Atl. 94; Weir v. Day, et al, 35 Ohio St. Ap. 143. 
In Stowe v. Hartford ~air Grounds Assoc~at~on, et 
al, 249 Mich. 107, 227 N. W. 702, a twenty-five yearlease 
from the defendant Hartford Fair Grounds Association, 
a profit corporation, was executed to the defendant, Van 
Buren County Agricultural and Horticultural Society, 
a non-profit corporation, at a nominal rental of $1.00 per 
year. In the course of the opinion the court states: 
"The circuit court judge held that the lease 
for twenty-five years was void. There was no 
necessity for giving a lease for this length of 
time under the conditions as hereinbefore set 
forth. It amounted practically to a sale of the 
assets and without any action by the stock-
holders * * * . 
''The evidence in this case shows that the 
consideration in the least was adequate and pro-
per. However, it might develop during the bal-
ance of the term of the corporate franchise or a 
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renewal thereof that the agricultural society or 
some other responsible lessee might be able to 
run a fair at a profit without any subsidies and 
exempt from taxation. In that event if a more 
profitable offer for a lease could he secured the 
fair association should not be in a position where 
it would forever be precluded from accepting such 
offer. The judge was correct in holding that the. 
lease for twenty-five years was void." 
Appellants argue that the agreements under con-
sideration were entered into by the state fair association 
as an exercise of its proprietary functions rather than 
as an exercise of its governmental functions. With this, of 
course, the respondents violently disagree. As has pre-
viously been pointed out, the fair association is an arm 
of the government, designed for the purpose of educating 
the people and, therefore, a governmental function. It 
was not created for the purpose of providing the state 
with revenue or profit. In this connection appellants, on 
page thirty-seven of their brief, admit that the agree-
ments were executed solely for the purpose of raising 
revenue. This being true, it is certainly outside the scope 
of the purposes and objectives of the Utah State Fair 
Association. Appellants feel that all discussion and argu-
ment by appellants relating to the Centennial celebra-
tion and the Utah Centennial Commission is immaterial 
and irrelevant. The Utah Centennial Commission was 
never a party to the agreement. 
To the matter in question it is immaterial a;s to the 
status of the stockholders of Beehive Midways, Inc. per-
taining to recovering back any money which they have 
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expended. They expended money in an attempt to make 
a profit solely for their own benefit. Whether they make 
a profit or not is immaterial in this proceedings. 
The agreements under consideration would certainly 
limit and circumvent successors in office as to their con-
trol of future state fairs. If the successors to the present 
members of the Utah State Fair Association are bound 
by the terms of these agreements, they would not in the 
future be able to provide what they might think is the 
proper form or type of amusement which would be most 
likely to attract the general public to the state fairs. 
V. THE STATE OF UTAH AND ITS FAIR ASSO-
CIATION IS ESTOPPED FRO::'.[ QUESTIONING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT, 
AND TI-IE RESPONDENTS l\IAY NOT vVAIVE 
SUCH ESTOPPEL. 
Respondents find it ra:ther difficult to discuss the 
proposition set forth in this topic inasmuch as the same 
is certainly unique. As we follow the argument of the 
appellants, it is to the effect that the State of Utah can-
not question the validity of the agreements because the 
stockholders of Beehive Midways, Inc. have expended 
considerable money. Therefore, the State of Utah would 
he estopped from questioning the validity of the agree-
ments, and this being true, the respondents and the gen-
eral public are also estopped. We are unable to follow 
this line of reasoning. Certainly the respondents have 
done nothing which could be construed as creating an 
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estoppel which might exist in favor of Beehive Midways, 
Inc. as against the State of Utah. 
If the fair association, in the first instant, did not 
have the requisite authority to enter into the agreement, 
then nothing that either the fair association or Beehive 
Midways, Inc. did thereafter could validate the agree-
ment. The sole question is, did the fair association, 11nder 
the Utah statutes, have the authority to enter into the 
agreements 1 Respondents contend that the answer is 
definitely in the negative. 
As was held in Campbell Bui~ing Compamy v. State 
Road Commission, (Supra) the authority of public of-
ficers is limited to the terms of the statute conferring 
such authority, and any person doing business with the 
state by way of contract or otherwise, must take notice 
of the limitations on the authority of the officers or 
agents of the state. 
Furthermore, the issue of estoppel was not raised in 
the pleadings, and it is a settled rule of law in this juris-
diction that a party, in order to avail itself of the de .. 
fense of estoppel, must plead the same. 
Campbell v. Nunn (Utah) 2 P. 2d 899; Bar-
ber v. Anderson (Utah) 274 P. 136. 
Respondents also doubt that the question of estoppel, 
even though properly pleaded, could be raised in this 
type of action. The action is for a declaratory judgment 
wherein the court is asked to make an interpretation of 
a contract and declare it either valid or void. It would 
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seem that any qt )n of estoppel would be premature 
until such time aL LIH: validity of the contract had been 
denied or upheld. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PETITION OF CENTENNIAL COM~1ISSION 
LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN THE CAUSE. 
As has been previously pointed out in this brief, the 
Centennial Commission was not a party to the lease 
agreements. It, together with various other state agen-
cies, including the attorney general's office, approved 
the supplemental agreement, but was not bound as a 
party to this agreement. Furthermore, the Centennial 
Commission, by statute, terminates on July 24, 1949, 
and the lease agreements, according to their terms, are 
to remain in effect until 1951, with an option for an ad-
ditional five years. 
The Centennial Commission filed with the lower 
court a petition for leave to intervene, together with a 
proposed complaint. The trial court, taking into consid-
eration the fact that the Centennial Commission was not 
a party to the agreements, and the fact that it would go 
out of existence on July 24, 1949, denied the petition to 
intervene. The appellants did not join with the Centen-
nial Commission in petitioning for intervention and are, 
therefore, not a proper party to raise this issue upon ap-
peal. If it could be considered that the trial court erred 
in denying the Centennial Commission's petition to inter-
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vene, then such error could only be . ~aled by the Cen-
•· ,-
tennial Commission itself. 
~\'I-· 
Appellants filed with the lower court a supplemental 
answer (Tr. 39-47), wherein the powers and duties of the 
Centennial Commission were set forth, and the court 
was requested to direct the plaintiffs to make the Cen-
tennial Commission a party to the proceeding. The trial 
court denied this prayer, again taking into consideration 
the fact that the Centennial Commission was not a party 
to the contract, and further, that the Centennial Com-
mission would be out of existence during the greater 
portion of the life of the agreement. 
The interest which the Centennial Commission had 
in this action was no greater than that of any private 
citizen of the State of Utah or any other state agency. 
In fact it was less in view of the fact that the commis-
sion was to he terminated on July 24, 1949. Respondents 
contend that the trial court did not abuse its di'Scretion in 
refusing appellants' request to make the Centennial Com-
mission a party to the action. The rule relating to neces-
sary parties in an action for declaratory relief is stated 
in 16 Am. J ur., Page 330, as follows: 
''The general rule that all persons interested 
in the controversy must be parties to an action 
for declaratory relief requires that, ordinarily, 
all interested persons who are not plaintiffs be 
made defendants. The rule is not, however, man-
datory in every case and does not preclude the 
exercise of the discretion of a court of equity as 
to who are necessary parties, especially where 
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the statute involved provides, as does the uniform 
act, that no declaration shall prejudice the rights 
of persons not parties.'' 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, respondents submit tha·t the decision of 
the trial court, holding the lease agreemen t:s between the 
Utah State Fair As·sociation and Beehive Midways, Inc., 
invalid, should be sustained for the following reasons as 
argued in this brief: 
1. The lease agreements exceed the limitations of 
the fair association's leasing power as set forth and de-
fined in 85-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, in that said 
agreements are for a longer period of time than that per-
mitted under the statute, and that they are for a purpose 
not permitted for under the statute. 
2. The lease agreements are void for the reason 
that they are for a period of time in excess of the terms 
of office of the members of the Utah State Fair Board. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER 
BEVERLY S. CLENDENIN 
JAMESINGEBRETSEN 
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